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WORLD WAR I AND THE
ARMENIAN GENOCIDE:
LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR
CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
Julia Koch*

ABSTRACT
For all of its advancements in international law, including
delivering justice to the war criminals of the Second World War,
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg has long been
tainted with accusations of victors’ justice and criticized for
violating the principle of nullem crimen sine lege. Such is the
case for crimes against humanity, a crime that did not exist in
positive international law until the 1945-46 legal proceedings in
Nuremberg. But the historiography of the First World War—an
era where punishment for war crimes is generally viewed as a
wholesale failure—provides an additional, indeed novel, basis
for understanding the Tribunal’s 1946 convictions for crimes
against humanity as legitimate and not marred by accusations
of victors’ justice. In particular, the 1915 declaration issued by
the Allied powers in response to the Armenian genocide and the
1919 peace process, including the post-war report on war crimes,
reveal that the convictions in Nuremberg for crimes against
humanity were not the hollow farce that some suggest they were.
Although the manner in which war crimes were dealt with
following World War I is most commonly viewed as a failed
effort, “crimes against humanity” was first coined as a term in
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international law during this period, and this essential linguistic
thread not only connects the world wars but provides critical
support for the International Military Tribunal’s later
convictions.
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INTRODUCTION

“It was when the Nazi regime declared that the German
people not only were unwilling to have any Jews in Germany but
wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the face
of the earth that the new crime, the crime against humanity [...]
appeared.”1 Hannah Arendt wrote this in 1963, shortly after the
trial, conviction, and execution of Adolph Eichmann, the man
often referred to as the architect of the Holocaust.2 It was the
Holocaust, she noted, that gave occasion to the creation of crimes
against humanity, a charge for offenses “against the human
status, or against the very nature of mankind.”3
Crimes against humanity were written into international
law for the first time during the 1945 peace talks in London
(“London Conference”) following World War II.4 As part of the
post-war processes, the Allies formed the International Military
Tribunal (“IMT” or “Tribunal”) and drafted its Charter, which
established the terms for the prosecution and punishment of the
“Major War Criminals of the European Axis” (“Charter”).5
Indeed, until 1945, “the words used in the Preambles of the
[First and Fourth Hague Conventions, dated 1899 and 1907
(“1899 Hague Convention” and “1907 Hague Convention,”
respectively)] were the only references in conventional
international law from which to draw on in formulating the term
‘crimes against humanity.’”6 The IMT and its Charter marked
an important development in international law, imposing, for
the first time, criminal responsibility on individuals for
1 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 268 (Penguin Books 2006).
2 See id. at xi–xiv.
3 Id. at 268.
4 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 92–95 (2011)
(describing the inclusion of “crimes against humanity” in the Charter and
noting, “[t]he London Charter [...] was the first international instrument to
define [crimes against humanity] in positive international law”) [hereinafter
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY].
5 Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL 120, 120–21 (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008); see CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 95, 127.
6 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 86–87; see Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; Convention
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
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violations of international law as committed against “any
civilian population,” including their own.7 The Charter and IMT
would mark the creation of new international law and the
codification of the legal and universal protection of human rights
in a way that had never been done before.8
However, charging and convicting individuals of new crimes
has long invited accusations that such crimes are nothing more
than ex post facto law or, in the context of war, victors’ justice.9
Nullem crimen sine lege, the principle that a law must exist in
order to impose corresponding punishment, calls into question
the legality of new law that exacts retroactive punishment for
prior acts and casts a long shadow on much of international
criminal law.10 Beyond these concerns for legality and whether
such a crime is indeed a crime “in the legal sense of the word,”
victors’ justice presents additional challenges to the fairness of
post-war prosecutions due to the victors’ treatment of the
vanquished.11 Victors’ justice assumes that the victors will act
WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES 31–32 (2012); see Michael J.
Kelly & Timothy L.H. McCormack, Contributions of the Nuremberg Trial to the
Subsequent Development of International Law, in THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG:
CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONALISED VENGEANCE? 102–03 (David A.
Blumenthal & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 2008) (explaining that the
Charter codified, for the first time, crimes against the peace, which are often
referred to as crimes of aggression or waging an aggressive war); Quincy
Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL 320, 340–41 (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008).
8 See Kelly & McCormack, supra note 7, at 101, 104–05; TELFORD TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 4–5 (2013); Lawrence Douglas, The
Memory of Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust, and Denial, 7 HIST. & MEMORY
100, 104–05 (2001).
9 See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 47; see also Kelly & McCormack, supra note
7, at 105–06 (“The Defence at Nuremburg argued strenuously against
criminalisation of aggression on the basis that [the Charter] amounted to the
creation of law ex post facto in violation of the fundamental principle nullem
crimen sine lege […] Others since Nuremberg have adopted and reiterated the
Defence argument as a major criticism of both the Nuremburg and the Tokyo
trials.”); DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 50 (explaining that the sitting United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone declined to administer the
oath to the American prosecutors at the IMT and described the tribunal as
little more than a “high-grade lynching affair”).
10 See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 47–50 (Such “arguments about
retroactive prosecution persist at both the judicial and political levels. The
development of international criminal law is accompanied by constant
attempts to reassess the past.”).
11 See id. at 47–50, 73–74 (describing concerns about victors’ justice
falling into three distinct categories: (i) application of legal norms; (ii)
fairness of legal proceedings; and (iii) identification of defendants).
7
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out of vengeance, retaliation, and selfishness, and that the
victors will exercise—or abuse—their newfound power over the
vanquished simply because of their status as the victors.12 All
of these issues pose problems for the creation of legitimate
international law: law established ex post facto or out of
vengeance and retaliation lacks validity, yet unprecedented acts
of violence, especially those attendant to war, demand
punishment.13
Indeed, there has been a variety of criticisms levied against
the IMT and Charter. Many of these challenges focus on the lack
of legality for the charge of crimes against humanity, arguing
that, without precedent, the Charter and entire IMT process
were mere products of victors’ justice.14 Admittedly, “[c]rimes
See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 8–9, 11
(2000) [hereinafter STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE] (collecting examples and
quotations of historical instances of victors’ justice) (“To [legal] realists, a
war crimes tribunal is simply something that the countries that decisively
win a war inflict on the helpless country that loses it. It is punishment,
revenge, spectacle—anything but justice.”); SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 74–75
(noting that certain of the acts over which the Tribunal established
jurisdiction were perpetrated by Allied powers, including the Soviets’ role in
the Katyn massacre) (“The jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunals was
defined in such a way as to make the prosecution of any military or political
leaders of the Allies a legal impossibility.”).
13 See, e.g., STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 11 (admitting
that it is “hard not to be impressed with the force of much of the realist line
of argument” and listing historical examples of punishment imposed on a
losing nation); SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 47–49; but see CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 303 (discussing the notion that although the
principle of nullem crimen sine lege may be accepted in some national legal
systems, it is not directly applicable in this same sense to international law,
and that one reason for this divergence may be the differences in the legal
systems’ goals and techniques).
14 See, e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Development of International
Criminal Law After Nuremberg, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 409–
10 (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008) (characterizing the London Charter as a
“legal source[], whereby no general international law could be created with
regard to Germany, but only occupation law . . . .”); Kelly & McCormack, supra
note 7, at 102 (noting that the criticisms of the IMT’s application of crimes
against humanity with respect to “retrospectivity” were “even more
pronounced” than those critics relating to the IMT’s application of crimes
against the peace); DOUGLAS supra note 8, at 50 (noting the challenges posed
by critics to both the conception of crimes against humanity, as well as the
crime of waging an aggressive war, and observing that United States
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Chief American Prosecutor before the
Tribunal, “failed to quiet the charges of victors’ justice”). Other criticisms of
the Tribunal dealt with the concept of holding individuals responsible under
international law and with the validity of other crimes articulated in the
12
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against humanity did not exist as a category of international
crime” at the end of World War I, or for that matter, at the time
of Germany’s surrender to the Allies in the spring of 1945.15
And, it is true that there was “no unambiguous criminialisation
of a category of crimes known as crimes against humanity prior
to the drafting” of the Charter.16 These arguments were
presented contemporaneously by counsel for the German
defendants, and they forced the leaders of the Tribunal and
authors of the Charter to grapple with difficult yet, as we will
see, familiar concerns.17
One way in which the IMT responded to cries of victors’
justice was by limiting its findings of crimes against humanity
to acts that occurred only after the commencement of the war in
1939.18 The IMT found evidence of crimes against humanity
only in furtherance of the illegal aggressive war and not in
connection with conduct occurring prior to Germany’s invasion
of Poland in September 1939.19 In so doing, the Charter defined
crimes against humanity in a way that could be “construed as a
mere extension of war crimes,” the prohibition of which was
already included in positive international law.20 An additional
retort to the Charter’s critics asserts that humanitarian and
moral principles, including those codified in international law
predating WWII, were sufficient to give notice that any conduct
that inflicted harm, loss, and pain on the masses in the form of
Charter, including crimes against the peace. See, e.g., Kelly & McCormack,
supra note 7, at 102, 104 (articulating the concern regarding the Tribunal’s
ability to treat “individuals as subjects of the international legal system” and
similarly, “the notion of trying alleged war criminals for their violations of
international law”); TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 51 (discussing the legal
difficulties posed by charging defendants with crimes against peace).
15 Kelly & McCormack, supra note 7, at 107.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 105–07; SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 49.
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 11, 26 (1997) [hereinafter From Versailles to Rwanda]; Kelly &
McCormack, supra note 7, at 107–08.
19 From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 18, at 26; Kelly & McCormack,
supra note 7, at 107–08; see also SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 50–51 (“Absent
such a nexus with war, the Allied lawmakers said there could be no criminal
liability for the acts directed by a state against its own nationals.”).
20 Kelly & McCormack, supra note 7, at 107; see also From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 18, at 26 (“War crimes in [the Charter] included
customary law as identified, inter alia, by reference to the 1907 Hague
Convention.”).
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crimes against humanity carried with it the risk of criminal
punishment.21 A further position posits that although crimes
against humanity may be a new “innovation” in international
law, such innovation must be immediately accepted in light of
the “outraged conscience of the world” and the “enlightened
conception of the true purposes of the law of nations.” 22
A historical and linguistic analysis of events from World
War I provides yet another basis on which to rebut accusations
that the IMT and its Charter are mere products of victors’
justice.23 Specifically, the massacre of the Armenians by the
Turks in 1915 marked the first genocide of the twentieth
century, and the Allies’ 1915 declaration to Turkey, which
threatened criminal punishment for the killings (“Declaration”),
was the first time the term “crimes against humanity” was used
in the context of international law.24 The Allies’ immediate, midwar reaction to the massacre and the identity of the victims—
being nationals of non-Allied powers—suggest that recourse by
the Allies against the Turks was not a function of victors’
justice.25 Several years later, in 1919, an Allied post-war report
on the responsibility and criminality of the war (“Commission
Report”) drew on these same ideals and language.26 Along with
the Declaration, the Commission Report, which was intended to
complement the 1919 peace discussions in Paris (“Paris Peace
Conference”), would later influence the delegates at the London
21 SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 49–50 (explaining that with respect to crimes
against peace, the Tribunal had concluded that “there was a retroactive
dimension to prosecution for crimes against the peace, but [...] leaving such
wrongs unpunished would be unjust”); TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 51 (defending
the prosecution’s position with respect to crimes against the peace in
opining, “[o]nly the most incorrigible legalists can pretend to be shocked by
the conclusion that the perpetrator of an aggressive war acts at peril of being
punished for his perpetration, even if no tribunal has ever previously decided
that perpetration of an aggressive war is a crime.”).
22 SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 57.
23

Id. at 73.

24 See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY,

supra note 4, at 458–59 (illustrating how
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia prompted usage of “crimes against
humanity” in international law).
25 See Gary Bass, Victor’s Justice, Selfish Justice, 69 SOC. RSCH. 1035, 1042
(2002) [hereinafter Victor’s Justice, Selfish Justice] (arguing that, within the
context of victors’ justice, even liberal states tend to disproportionately fight
for justice for their own citizens, rather than for citizens of other nations).
26 See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 465 (showing how the
1919 Commission also favored prosecuting “crimes against humanity”).
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Conference.27
Particularly notable were the Commission
Report’s invocation of the 1907 Hague Convention, which
referred to the “laws of humanity,” and its enumeration of war
crimes, which included reference to “[m]assacres of Armenians
by the Turks.”28 Indeed, “when casting about for a precedent for
the Nuremberg category of crimes against humanity, the Allies
did not remember that they had used that precise term as early
as 1915.”29
Although experts have already offered a chronology of key
events in the development of crimes against humanity as
international positive law, a closer look at the historiography
surrounding the First World War sheds light on the evolution of
the charge as a legitimate tool at the IMT’s disposal.30 This
historiography provides the Charter and IMT with the
legitimacy necessary to affect a powerful and meaningful
protection of human rights following Nazi atrocities. Although
the WWI era attempts to address wartime criminality—
including the Declaration, Commission Report, and Paris Peace
Conference31—have largely been seen as unsuccessful, they
nevertheless contributed to the development of post-WWII
international law and are instrumental in combating concerns
that the IMT was nothing more than victors’ justice.

See M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: The War to End All Wars and the
Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 239, 254, 260 (2002) [hereinafter WWI & the Handicapped System]
(explaining how the delegates of the London Conference referenced the war
crimes in 1918 to reach their conclusion); JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO
NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE
FIRST WORLD WAR 68 (Greenwood Press ed., 1982).
28 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 262; WWI & the Handicapped
System, supra note 27, at 576; see, e.g., Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the
Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 113–15 (1920) (outlining
crimes addressed by the Commission) [hereinafter Commission Report].
29 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 144.
27

30 Norman J.W. Goda, Crimes Against Humanity and the Development of
International Law, NAT’L WORLD WAR II MUSEUM (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/crimes-against-humanityinternational-law.

31
See,
e.g.,
World
War
I,
HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/world-war-i-history#treatyof-versailles (Mar. 15, 2022) (summarizing the events of World War I,
including the Paris Peace Conference’s Treaty of Versailles, a treaty whose
“lofty goals” were not met).
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II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. The Faltering Empire and the Rise of the Young Turks
The Ottoman Empire, founded in the fourteenth century,
developed, expanded, and flourished for hundreds of years.32 In
the seventeenth century, however, the empire began to feel a
variety of internal and external pressures, which combined to
trigger its gradual decline.33 Sultans’ leadership abilities and
loss of power, systemic corruption, economic challenges, social
unrest, and a significantly weakened army all contributed to this
decline.34 Despite developing the nickname the Sick Man of
Europe, Turkey remained relevant in international affairs due
in large part to its highly coveted geography.35 In particular, the
Ottoman capital of Constantinople lay between the Dardanelles
and Bosporus straits, linking Europe to Asia and Russia to the
Mediterranean.36 After Britain rejected a permanent offer of
alliance from Turkey—in response to reports of Ottoman
incompetence and corruption—Germany established a military
alliance with Turkey on August 3, 1914, just over a month after
the Archduke of Austria was assassinated.37
32 See DOUGLAS A. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN E MPIRE 8–9
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2017) (providing history of the Ottoman Empire,
including its origins in the fourteenth century and governing sultans).
33 RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, A HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 25 (Eric D.
Weitz, ed., 2015); ULRICH TRUMPENER, GERMANY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 3
(1968).
34 TRUMPENER, supra note 33, at 3.
35 SUNY, supra note 33, at 25; BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST
161, 163 (Random House Publ’g Grp. ed., 2009).
36 See TUCHMAN, supra note 35, at 162–63.
37 TUCHMAN, supra note 35, at 163, 165; see ADAM HOCHSCHILD , TO END ALL
WARS: A STORY OF LOYALTY AND REBELLION, 1914–1918 79–81, 85, 92–93
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt ed., 2011) (stating that Austro-Hungarian
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot on June 28, 1914, which led Austria to
declare war on Serbia that same day. And depicting a map of the “The Path to
War,” which describes the course of events: Germany declared war on
Russia while France mobilized against Germany, Germany declared war on
France, and Britain declared war on Germany several days later after
Germany invaded neutral Belgium); see TUCHMAN, supra note 35, at 85
(describing how Austria’s decision to declare war was done with Germany’s
“faithful support” and ultimately set off a domino reaction: Russia mobilized
against Austria and Germany, and Austria countered and mobilized against
Russia); see also WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 245
(detailing the escalation from a local Balkan conflict to a continental one,
involving major Allied and Associated Powers).
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It was against this backdrop that the Young Turks, an
increasingly radical political party, came to power following a
1908 revolution.38 This shift in power and the strains of looming
war marked a change in the treatment of minorities in Turkey.39
Previously, the predominately Muslim Ottomans lived in
relative peace with the Christian minority; however, this “old
easy tolerance” gave way to Christian reprisals, which would
continue to escalate until the end of the First World War.40
Then-United States Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau,
described the Young Turks as being sincere in their 1908
attempt to rid the country of the sultan—the “great assassin”—
and establish a true democracy in his place.41 Soon, however,
the dreams of equality dissolved, and, according to Morgenthau,
a “wicked oligarchy” of men concerned with “personal power”
and “materialism” came to define the Young Turks’ rule. 42 In
1914, the Turkish government forcefully expelled Christian
Greeks from its territory; its desire to homogenize the empire
would have grave implications for the remaining Christians of
Turkey.43
38 See SUNY, supra note 33, at 154–58, 174 (describing the 1908
revolution and Young Turks’ rise to power as well as summarizing the
transformation of the Young Turks’ leadership towards authoritarianism
and, ultimately, dictatorship).
39 See id. at 4 (“Although the empire was by the nineteenth century most
often ruled by ethnic Turks, it was not conceived as an ethnic Turkish state
but as a multinational Islamic empire, which included [Christian] peoples.”);
see id. at 187 (noting that a “casualty” of the Balkan wars that immediately
preceded WWI, during which the Ottomans suffered a series of military
defeats, was the “ecumenical vision of the Ottomanists, the idea of a
multinational, religiously diverse empire of equal subjects”); see id. at 187–
88 (“In 1913 [it was] proposed a Turkey for Turks [...] rejecting Ottomanist
politics [...] as “Armenian politics.” [...] There was no place here for
Armenians, Greeks, or even Kurds.”).
40 MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919 350 (2003); see SUNY, supra note 33,
at 4; see also HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU’S STORY 12–13
(1918) (noting that, although Christian minorities in certain areas of the
Ottoman Empire had experienced violence and persecution at the hands of
the Turks for years, such oppression, comparatively speaking, rested upon
the Armenians rather lightly); TRUMPENER, supra note 33, at 201 (“The
overthrow of [the prior] despotic regime and the formal resurrection of a
constitutional form of government by the Young Turks in 1908 was initially
greeted by many Ottoman Armenians as the dawn of a new era, but their
hopes were quickly quashed.”).
41 MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 12.
42 Id. at 13–14.
43 See SUNY, supra note 33, at 193.
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B. The Armenian Massacres
The machinery of the Armenian genocide was already in
place by February 1915 as the Young Turks’ security policies
against their own countrymen grew increasingly radical.44
Included among these policies was the disarmament of
Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army.45
Instead of
combatants, Armenians were forced to work as “road labourers
and pack animals” and subject to beatings by whips and
bayonets.46 These soldiers, targeted because they were ablebodied men with access to weapons, were “not infrequently
massacred” or “disposed of in even more summary fashion.”47
Similarly, by the spring of 1915, many of the Armenian
intellectuals were exiled from their towns and often killed in the
process, leaving Armenians with little intellectual or political
leadership.48
Then, in late April of 1915, the Turkish
government began systematically deporting Armenians from
Ottoman cities, and those that survived the deportation arrived
in the Syrian desert.49 Marking a distinct escalation in policy,
the leader of the Young Turks ordered mass arrests of
Armenians on April 24, 1915 in an effort to protect the empire
from a supposed Armenian “revolt.”50 Among the justifications
for the arrests and deportations, the Turks labeled the
44 See MORGENTHAU, supra

note 40, at 301–02; SUNY, supra note 33, at 248.
note 40, at 302; SUNY, supra note 33, at 248; see
also TANER AKÇAM, THE YOUNG TURKS’ CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 137 (Princeton Univ.
Press ed., 2012) (describing, though not necessarily as part of a premeditated
plan, the Young Turks’ “disarming of Armenian recruits in the Ottoman Third
Army and their transfer to labor battalions, the searching of Armenian
villages for weapons, and the staging of raids against these villages to
appropriate food and other necessities for the war effort”).
46 MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 302.
47 Id. at 302–03 (explaining that in the city of Harpoot, for example, 2,000
Armenian soldiers were called away to help build roads and, upon learning
that they were being called to be executed, the townspeople pleaded with the
governor to protect the soldiers, however, despite the governor’s promise,
the Armenian soldiers were murdered and a few days later another 2,000
Armenian soldiers were sent away in the same manner).
48 See SUNY, supra note 33, at 274 (“With the soldiers disarmed and the
intellectuals and politicians under guard, the muscle and mind of the
Ottoman Armenians had been effectively eliminated.”).
49 AKÇAM, supra note 45, at xvii, 184, 188; MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at
314; SUNY, supra note 33, at 253.
50 SUNY, supra note 33, at 272–73.
45 See MORGENTHAU, supra
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Armenians as a “threat to the empire’s national security and
territorial integrity,” claiming that persecution was needed in
the name of military necessity.51
Nearly two million Armenians were targeted for
deportation, yet even before the caravans began moving south,
many of the Armenian men were separated from the women and
children, tied up together in small groups, and killed.52 In
Angora, for example, nearly all Armenian men between the ages
of fifteen and seventy were arrested and summarily executed.53
During the deportation, the Armenians—now mostly women
and children—were forced to travel on foot.54 The vast majority
of the Armenians—perhaps as many as 1.5 million—who were
ultimately deported died of starvation, exhaustion, or
dehydration before ever reaching Syria.55 Additionally, the
victims were subject to continuous beatings from the
accompanying gendarmes as well as from the Kurds and Turks
living in the mountains, and many were robbed and raped along
the way.56 One caravan walked for seventy days before arriving
in Aleppo; although approximately 18,000 Armenians began the
journey in this caravan, no more than 150 made it to the city.57
Between the summary executions that occurred throughout the
villages of the Ottoman Empire and the deportation of hundreds
of thousands of remaining Armenians, estimates conclude that
between 1 and 1.5 million Armenians perished during 1915.58
51 AKÇAM, supra note 45, at 125–26, 135, 227; see SUNY, supra note 33, at
245, 248, 273–75 (describing the Turks citing the need to punish the
Armenians and to protect their national ideals).
52 MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 302, 309, 311; see SUNY, supra note 33,
at xviii, 257 (describing the systematic separation of men from women and
children, the massacre of the former, and abduction of the latter).
53 MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 314 (Angora is the present-day Turkish
capital, Ankara).
54 Id. at 312, 315; see also SUNY, supra note 33, at 301 (quoting a German
diplomat’s description of the deadly conditions associated with the caravans
to the desert).
55 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 321; SUNY, supra note 33, at xx–xxi,
301, 345; John Kifner, Armenian Genocide of 1915: An Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_armeniangenocide.
html (last visited Apr. 18, 2022).
56 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 315–17, 320; SUNY, supra note 33, at
xx.
57 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 315–18, 321 (describing the
conditions faced by the caravans of refugees at the hands of the gendarmes).
58 SUNY, supra note 33, at 354–55 (noting that one of the primary
Ottoman leaders responsible for the massacre estimated fatalities to be
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The first genocide of the twentieth century, although largely
unpunished, would play a quiet yet important role in the
development of international humanitarian law as the basis for
crimes against humanity.59
III. THE 1915 DECLARATION: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
A. “New Crimes of Turkey Against Humanity and
Civilization”
Upon receiving notice of the ongoing deportation and
massacre in April of 1915, Russia promptly sought the support
of its allies in issuing a condemnation against Turkey.60 France
quickly agreed to issue a joint threat, while Britain stalled for
several weeks, concerned about a lack of first-hand accounts and
the limited efficacy of a written threat.61 Nevertheless, the
Russian foreign minister offered a first draft to the French and
British for approval, and after deliberation, the text of the final
Declaration read in pertinent part “[i]n view of these new crimes
of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied
governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they
will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members
of the Ottoman Government and those of their agents who are
implicated in such massacres.”62 This was the first time that the
concept of crimes against humanity had been articulated, and

about 1.5 million and recounting other scholars’ estimates to reflect similar
figures); Kifner, supra note 55; see also Q&A: Armenian Genocide Dispute, BBC
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16352745
(comparing Armenians’ estimated calculation of victims—roughly 1.5
million—to Turkey’s approximation—about 300,000).
59 See W ILLIS, supra note 27, at 69, 156 (“The Allies were even less
successful than the sultan’s government in trying Turkish war criminals [for
the Armenian massacres].”); see, e.g., STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note
12, at 106 (“Constantinople is the Nuremberg that failed.”); CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 88 (“Nothing came out of [the 1915 Declaration”]).
60 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 114–15.
61 Id. at 115; WILLIS, supra note 27, at 26.
62 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 117 (quoting a letter
from William G. Sharp to William J. Bryan on May 28, 1915, in PAPERS
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE WORLD WAR 981
(1915 Supp. 1928)) (Sublime Porte was used in referencing the government
of the Ottoman Empire).
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even somewhat defined, in the context of international law.63 On
May 24, the joint Declaration was issued in London, Paris, and
Petrograd, and it was delivered to the Ottoman leaders
personally.64 Unfortunately, the Declaration had no immediate
or meaningful impact on the conduct of the Ottoman leaders,
and notwithstanding additional commitments by the British
Parliament to punish the Turks for their treatment of the
Armenians, the Allies moved forward, focused on other aspects
of the war.65 Additionally, given that the Declaration was a
legally non-binding document, the Allies’ enforcement of the
threat was essentially non-existent, as the Brits feared it might
be; it was not until 1945–46 that crimes against humanity would
carry meaningful criminal sanctions.66
B. Concern for the Armenians Transcended Nationality,
Wartime Alliances, and Religion
The identity and relationship of the Armenian victims
relative to the world’s major powers is critical in understanding
the impact that these WWI era events had in setting forth a
foundation for the IMT decades later. Three key observations
that contribute to this impact are: (i) the victims were not
nationals of an Allied power or even a neutral state, but were
instead citizens of a belligerent nation; (ii) objection and outrage
came from Britain, France, and Russia, as well as Axis Germany
and neutral United States; and (iii) the killings were depicted as
atrocities against mankind, rather than more exclusively and
narrowly against Christians.67 Together, these three attributes
provide a growing cache of evidence that, long before the horrors
of World War II, the world was identifying, taking issue with,
and developing an increasingly valid template to punish crimes
against humanity—one that was not built on victors’ justice.
A common theme in the prosecution of war crimes is the
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 88.
note 12, at 116; MORGENTHAU, supra
note 40, at 359; WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 262.
65 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 88; WILLIS, supra note 26, at
27; see also STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 144–46 (describing
the 1919 Constantinople war crimes trials as forgotten and generally
unsuccessful in their aims).
66 See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 26–27.
67 See id. at 24–27 (describing the Armenian genocide and the
perspectives of the different nations involved in WWI).
63

64 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra
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nationality of the victims; this often dictates whether, and to
what extent, the crimes will be punished.68 A nation is more
likely to seek the prosecution and punishment of war crimes
when the victims are its own citizens, rather than foreigners.69
Even the most liberal countries, typically advocates of universal
human rights, nevertheless “put [their] own citizens first—to an
amazing degree.”70 Thus, the fact that the victims of the
genocide were citizens of Turkey lends itself to establishing the
legitimacy of the Allies’ response and the validity of the
burgeoning positive law crime of crimes against humanity. The
Armenians were not only citizens of a non-Allied nation, but they
were citizens of a wartime enemy, some of whom also served in
the Turkish army.71 With this in mind, the Allies’ Declaration
marks a turning point in history towards a “truly universal
conception of human rights,” a concept that would become the
centerpiece for the war trials several decades later when
defendants were convicted for the systematic massacre of Jews
68 See, e.g., WILLIS, supra note 27, at 13, 19 (describing France’s desire to
try German soldiers on the basis that “the Germans seemed to be continuing
in France the deliberate use of terror that they had begun in Belgium”)
(“[British diplomat] Lord Robert Cecil strongly pressed [British Prime
Minister Herbert Henry] Asquith to threaten future prosecution of those who
mistreated British prisoners of war, ‘whether he be Kaiser or any
subordinate of his.’”).
69 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 8, 14 (describing the
Allied effort to pursue justice for Armenian victims, “not citizens of the victor
states,” as an anomaly); Victor’s Justice, Selfish Justice, supra note 25, at 14.
70 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 8, 106 (“The
Constantinople trials were driven at first by a striking display of British
idealism and universalism. Even though the Armenian victims of the 1915
massacres were foreigners (albeit Christians), the British public and much of
its elite were outraged.”).
71 MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 302; see SUNY, supra note 33, at 248–49
(explaining that in reality of course, the Allies were more than willing to
advance its wartime agenda and take issue with the way in which a
belligerent treated its own citizens); see STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra
note 12, at 107, 112 (characterizing Britain’s outrage at the Turkish atrocities
as “self-serving” and arguing that its desire to pursue justice against the
Ottoman government was highly motivated by a desire to mete out
punishment for treatment of British prisoners of war, even more so than for
the treatment of Armenian civilians. “[B]oth Russia and France saw the
Armenians as potentially useful in the war against Turkey.”); see WILLIS,
supra note 27, at 25 (“The Allies could respond without restraint [as
compared to Germany], for they had decided to destroy the Ottoman
Empire.” Noting that multiple German representatives were deeply
concerned about the Young Turks’ behavior towards the Armenian
population as well).
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living in Allied, Axis, and neutral states.72
Importantly, it was not only the Allied nations that issued
the threat against Turkey, but condemnation for the Armenian
massacres transcended wartime alliances.73 When the German
Ambassador to Turkey died suddenly in October 1915, Germany
sought to name a replacement, but the Turkish government
rejected the man Germany had proposed, indicating that he
would not be welcome in Constantinople due to his position
regarding the Turks’ treatment of the Armenians.74 The
replacement on which the Germans and Turks ultimately
settled was Paul von Wolff-Metternich, who became unpopular
in Constantinople nearly overnight due to his own “outspoken
criticism of [the Turks’] Armenian policy” and severe reproach
towards the Turkish government “for its handling of the
Armenian question.”75 As a result of von Wolff-Metternich’s
inability to “talk about anything but the Armenian persecutions”
and “unceasing efforts to intercede on behalf of the Armenians,”
he was replaced as ambassador in just over a year.76 Throughout
1915, the German government, through various representatives,
issued a series of statements advising, requesting, and
ultimately admonishing the Sublime Porte for its treatment of

72 See, e.g., William Maley, The Atmospherics of the Nuremberg Trial, in
THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG: CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONALISED
VENGEANCE? 7 (David A. Blumenthal & Timothy L.H. McCormack ed., 2008)
(quoting Justice Jackson’s opening statement before the IMT, in Trial of the
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 99 (1971)) (“The real complaining party
at your bar is Civilization. [Civilization] does expect that [the IMT’s] juridical
action will put the forces of international law, its precepts, its prohibitions
and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women of
good will, in all countries, may have ‘leave to live by no man’s leave,
underneath the law.’”); see also STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at
116 (describing Britain’s move from “pan-Christian solidarity toward a truly
universal conception of human rights” as a meaningful development
resulting from the Declaration).
73 See TRUMPENER, supra note 33, at 204 (noting that contrary to the
“assertions of several recent authors, the wartime persecution of the
Ottoman Armenians was neither instigated nor welcomed by the German
government.”).
74 Id. at 125.
75 Id. at 125–26.
76 Id. at 126–27; Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National
and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary
Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 221, 258 (1989).
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the Armenians.77 In particular, and following a memorandum
from the German Ambassador critical of the Turks’ conduct, an
August 1915 memorandum to the Ottoman government stated
that “by order of [the German] government, [the interim German
Ambassador had to] remonstrate once again against these acts
of horror” against the Armenian population.78 To be sure, not all
Germans opposed the Turkish massacres, and at the highest
levels, it became evident that Germany as a whole would not
intervene.79 However, those that did object and seek action
against the atrocities helped ensure that the emerging term
“crimes against humanity” was not vengeful or retaliatory in
nature, but that it was rooted in ideals of universal
humanitarianism.
Additionally, the Americans, largely through Ambassador
Morgenthau, were also appalled by the news of the Armenian
genocide.80 In 1915, the United States had not yet entered the
war and was not formally a member of the Allied powers. 81
See TRUMPENER, supra note 33, at 213–19.
Id. at 218; see also WILLIS, supra note 27, at 25 (discussing how, not
dissimilarly, German general Otto Liman von Sanders leveraged his position
in the military and personally intervened to prevent deportations in one
Ottoman town); see also MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 372 (discussing how
Paul Weitz, a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, urged the new
German Ambassador in Constantinople to intervene) (stating “‘I remember
that you told me at the beginning’ […] ‘what a mistake Germany was making
in the Armenian matters. I agreed with you perfectly. But when I urged this
view upon [Ambassador] Wangenheim, he threw me twice out of the
room!’”).
79 See, e.g., TRUMPENER, supra note 33, at 204, 208, 225–26, 231
(describing various German authorities’ decisions not to act, intervene, or
otherwise “strain Germany’s political relationship” with Turkey) (noting
that, in its refusal to act, the Central Powers were “guilty of extremely poor
judgment, a considerable degree of moral callousness, and an altogether
excess concern with what was or seemed to be politically expedient.”);
WILLIS, supra note 27, at 25 (“The German government, however, set first
priority on preserving its military alliance with the Turks, and its efforts to
encourage moderation were for the most part calculated not to offend the
Young Turks.”).
80 See THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND AMERICA’S OUTCRY: A COMPILATION OF U.S.
DOCUMENTS, 1890-1923 (1985) (including the following newspaper headlines
from the fall of 1915: “U.S. Aid to Armenians: Ambassador Morgenthau Is
Told to Protest Against Massacres,” from The Washington Post; “Morgenthau
Giving Relief: American Consuls Will Also Do What They Can to Aid
Armenians,” from The New York Times; “Tell Horrors Done In Armenia:
Turkish Record Outdone: A Policy of Extermination Put in Effect Against a
Helpless People,” from The New York Times).
81 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 37, at 267.
77
78
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Although the country’s firm isolationist policy and political
concerns stymied its response to the massacres, the American
Ambassador held extensive conversations, often peppered with
arguments and political threats, with one of the foremost
Ottoman leaders, Talaat Pasha (“Talaat Bey”).82 However,
despite public outrage, the Americans maintained that
precedent did not support intervention or punishment of the
Turkish leaders: as the victims were Turkish citizens and no
Americans had been harmed, the massacres were considered a
domestic matter, particularly since America never entered the
war against Turkey.83 Furthermore, the Americans took the
position that the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention did
not apply since the convention proscribed rules for war between
belligerent nations and their armies, rather than between a
government and its citizens.84 Although some of these concerns
remained decades later during the IMT in Nuremberg, the
events of the WWI era contributed to the development of the
very positive international law that the Americans and others
found lacking in 1915.85
82 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 110 (describing the
American reaction to the Armenian massacres as stunted, due to the fact that
any significant response would lead the United States to war with the
Ottoman Empire, something that it had “struggled mightily to avoid”);
MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 335 (recounting a conversation with Talaat
Bey in which Morgenthau warned, “You will have to meet public opinion
everywhere, especially in the United States. Our people will never forget
these massacres. [...] You are defying all ideas of justice as we understand the
term”).
83 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 59, 102, 110
(reporting that, according to Robert Lansing, the United States did not have
“jurisdiction to pass upon violations of the laws and customs of war, unless
such violations were committed upon American persons”); MORGENTHAU,
supra note 40, at 328–30 (“I had no right to interfere. According to the coldblooded legalities of the situation, the treatment of Turkish subjects by the
Turkish Government was purely a domestic affair; unless it directly affected
American lives and American interests, it was outside the concern of the
American Government.”); See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 69–70 (noting that
American post-war involvement was limited when it came to questions of
punishing the Turks, punishing the Kaiser, holding war crimes trials, or
establishing an international tribunal and the American delegation generally
found no precedent supporting these actions while led by Lansing).
84 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 13; WILLIS, supra note 27, at 156–57; see also
1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 46 (dictating that when territory
is occupied by a hostile state “the lives of persons, and private property” are
to be respected, but not extending this requirement to states’ treatment of
civilians in their own, unoccupied territory).
85 See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 157.
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Besides nationality, the Allies also declined to view the
atrocities exclusively through the lens of religion. 86 Initially, the
proposed language offered by the Russian foreign minister
catered to a more narrow, traditional perspective and read, “[i]n
face of these fresh crimes committed by Turkey against
Christianity and civilisation.”87 Admittedly, the “overtly panChristian” wording was not out of place in this era, as Allied war
propaganda often drew on bigoted religious distinctions to vilify
the Ottoman Muslims.88
Importantly, however, these
sentiments were changing, and neither the British nor, to an
extent, the French, were keen to position the Declaration as a
religious duel between Christians and Muslims. 89 Britain
pushed back and specifically opposed any mention of Christians
or Muslims, and the French agreed.90 Ultimately, the Russian
foreign minister adjusted the language to its final text, and
replaced “crimes against Christianity” with “crimes against
humanity.”91 The American Ambassador similarly rejected
religion as a basis for opposition to, and condemnation of, the
Armenian massacres.92 In his memoir, Morgenthau recalled a
discussion he had with Talaat Bey and noted, “the fact that [...]
there are such things as humanity and civilization, never for a
moment enters their mind.” 93 When questioned by Talaat Bey
about why Morgenthau, as a Jew, cared about what happened to
the Christians in Turkey, Morgenthau responded: “I am not here
86 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 116; see also SCHABAS,
supra note 7, at 30 (“An early draft [of the Declaration] referred to ‘these new
crimes of Turkey against Christianity and civilization.’ That was nothing
particularly innovative, because the major European powers had long
asserted their entitlement to intervene in Turkish affairs in order to protect
Christian minorities. [...] When the authors of the [D]eclaration replaced the
word ‘Christianity’ with ‘humanity’ they turned a corner.”).
87 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 112, 115 (noting that
again, with respect to the Allied war aims and motivations, it should be noted
that many Armenians also lived in the Russian Caucuses and, as Russian
citizens, were drafted into the Russian army) (quoting letter from Sir George
William Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey (May 11, 1915)); WILLIS, supra note 27,
at 25 (showing that the Russian foreign minister cited a boost to the morale
of the Armenian soldiers in his army as one motivation for issuing the
Declaration).
88 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 116.
89 Id.; see WILLIS, supra note 27, at 26.
90 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 116.
91 Id. at 116–17.
92 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 333–35.
93 Id. at 334.
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as a Jew, but as American Ambassador [...] I do not appeal to
you in the name of any race or religion, but merely as a human
being [...] You must base your principles on humanitarianism.”94
Thus, the focus of the Allies’ Declaration was on neither the
nationality or the religion of the Armenian victims and instead,
the Allies emphasized a conception of universal human rights.95
This concern for the citizens of other nations, even citizens of
belligerent nations, became a fundamental focus of the IMT and
subsequent WWII trials.96
C. The Declaration as a Contemporaneous Threat
In April 1915, when news of the massacres and deportation
spread internationally, the Allies promptly began discussing
repercussions for Turkey’s conduct.97 Although it would take
about one month to agree upon the language and issue the
Declaration,98 the Allies’ immediate reaction to the massacre is
of significant import. By spring 1915, less than one-quarter of
the war had been fought, and the United States would not enter
the hostilities for another two years.99 Though scholars have
remarked on the Allies’ political and wartime motives for
delivering the Declaration,100 the Allies’ mid-war threat, as
Id.
STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 116 (“Britain preferred
to see this as an issue of civilization versus barbarism, not Christians versus
Muslims.”); MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, at 334 (“I do not appeal to you in the
name of any race or religion, but merely as a human being.”).
96 From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 18, at 26 (describing the
definition of “crimes against humanity,” as understood by the IMT to cover
war crimes against “protected persons, namely civilians, in time of war
between belligerent states”); STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at
31 (“Liberal states are more apt to pursue prosecution for war crimes
committed against their own citizens; but because they are universalists,
liberal states may also be outraged by crimes against humanity committed
against noncitizens. Selfishness predominates, but not totally.”).
97 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 115.
98 See id. at 115–16 (explaining the process when determining the
language to be used on Britain's official announcement to the violence that
happened in Turkey).
99 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 37, at 92–93 (showing the initial invasions
and declarations of war in August 1914); MACMILLAN, supra note 40, at xxvi
(indicating that WWI began in 1914 and concluded in November 1918).
100 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 115; WILLIS, supra
note 27, at 25–26; see also WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at
249 (describing various political and other reasons the Allied attempt to
prosecute Turks for the Armenian genocide following the war failed).
94
95
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legally unenforceable as it may have been, rebuts critics’ later
challenges to the Nuremberg Charter’s ex post facto laws and
provides greater legitimacy to both the Charter and the IMT.
Perhaps most important is the fact that the Allies’
Declaration came on the heels of a significant military failure at
the Dardanelles. The Allies launched a naval offensive in
February 1915 at the mouth of the Dardanelles strait, which
runs to the east of Turkey’s Gallipoli peninsula.101 The initial
attack failed, and the Allies launched a second land offensive on
the peninsula in April.102 The Allied military forces faced
devastating losses and the conflict became known as the Battle
of Gallipoli.103 It was after the failed naval attack in February—
and during the April offensive that would fail even more
spectacularly—that the Allies issued the Declaration.104 Thus,
with victory far from secured, the Declaration could not have
been built on victors’ justice.
Additionally, the Allies’ immediate reaction to the
Armenian massacre contrasts in some respects with their
response to German atrocities committed against Belgian and
French civilians. By the time the Germans had conquered
Belgium and northern France in the fall of 1914, some 5,500
Belgian and 900 French civilians had been killed. 105 In one
instance, and in response to alleged civilian attacks on his
A Short History Of The Dardanelles Campaign, IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUMS,
https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/a-short-history-of-the-dardanellescampaign (last visited Apr. 18, 2022).
102 Id.
103 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 37, at 156.
104 Joshua Hammer, A View of the Battle of Gallipoli, One of the Bloodiest
Conflicts of World War I, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb., 2015),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/new-view-battle-gallipoli-onebloodiest-conflicts-world-war-i-180953975/ ( highlighting that the Battle of
Gallipoli was one of the bloodiest battles of the war because the Allies
suffered about 180,000 casualties and when combined with the losses from
the Central Powers, nearly half a million men died or were wounded); but cf
WILLIS, supra note 27, at 25, 26 (supporting the argument that the Allies’
“territorial ambitions” in the Balkans and their “policy of total victory”
prompted the Declaration and indicating that the Allies began signing “secret
treaties” in the spring of 1915 in order to divide up the Ottoman land after
an Allied war victory).
105 Sophie de Schaepdrijver, The ‘German Atrocities’ of 1914, BRIT. LIBR.
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/civilianatrocities-german-1914 (stating that many of these victims had been
rounded up and shot by the invading German army on the suspicion of being
civilian snipers).
101
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troops, a German commander ordered his men to burn the
villages and to shoot all the inhabitants; this order was expressly
approved of by General Karl von Bülow, who would be later
named as a war criminal by the French.106 Significant public
outcry over the atrocities demanded that the German troops be
captured and tried for their crimes.107 Although some mid-war
trials convicted individual German soldiers, many of the French
and Belgian legal maneuvers came after the war in an
aggressive pursuit of naming, extraditing, and trying German
war criminals.108 These highly energized demands began to
resemble the machinations of victors’ justice: the “countries that
suffered more pushed harder for prosecution” of the Germans.109
To be sure, Germans had engaged in a range of egregious
wartime conduct; however, other Allied leaders warned against
the perception of victors’ justice that would be created by these
unprecedented and large-scale trials immediately following the
war.110 British Prime Minister David Lloyd George noted that
the Allies were
asking more than any Government could be expected to comply
with […] if in different circumstances, a demand had been made
by a German Government on a British or French Government for
the handing over of 800 officers, he did not believe [it was unlikely]
that they would ever comply with it. No British or French
Government could do so.111
106 See JOHN N. HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN ATROCITIES, 1914: A HISTORY
OF DENIAL 162 (2001); WILLIS, supra note 27, at 121.
107 See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 13.

108 See id. (stating that “long-established custom” allowed for warring
countries to try captured enemy soldiers for war crimes during hostilities,
and that France, as early as September 1914 began a series of military court
trials to try German war criminals).
109 See STAY THE HAND OF V ENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 78 (stating that
when the final list was reduced to 854 Germans, and the Belgian and the
French accounted for nearly half of the names.); see also id. (stating the Allies’
post-war list of German war criminals included 1,580 individuals, with
Belgium and France naming approximately 1,400 of them).
110 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 99; CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 91; WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27,
at 254–55; see also TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that, with respect to
the findings of the Commission Report relating to the Kaiser and crimes
against the peace, President Woodrow Wilson was “concerned about ‘victors’
justice’”).
111 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 79; see WILLIS, supra
note 27, at 121 (highlighting that France’s proposed list of war criminals
included powerful German figures like the Crown Prince of Bavaria, Field
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As a result, the Germans increasingly saw the post-war
punishments as victors’ justice and as a way for Allies to “justify
the ambition to conquer Germany.”112
In this way, the
Declaration was different.
Although historical, political, and legal complexities reign,
a historiographical analysis of the 1915 Declaration
unequivocally moves international law forward. Indeed, the
identity of the Armenians as non-Allied citizens and the
immediate Allied threat to the Ottoman leaders marked an
important point in the evolution of international law: the
concern for humanity transcended national boundaries as
punishment was motivated by something more than vengeance
and retaliation.113
IV. WWI’S IMPACT ON THE CHARTER AND IMT
A. Post-War Efforts to Punish for Crimes Against
Humanity
After the war, the Turkish government established a courtsmartial in Constantinople at the demand of the British
(“Constantinople Courts-Martial”) that, at the outset, had
potential to drive unprecedented development in international
law.114 Regrettably, the Constantinople Courts-Martial quickly
collapsed and was ultimately added to the list of post-WWI
failures.115 However, despite Britain forcing the hand of the
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, General Karl von Bülow, and General Erich
Ludendorff).
112 WILLIS, supra note 27, at 29; see discussion infra sec. III (discussing
Allied efforts to hold the Turks criminally and individually responsible for
war crimes during the 1919 courts-martial in Constantinople stumbled
through similar hurdles).
113 See generally WILLIS, supra note 27, at 25 (discussing the moral
outrage felt by many Armenians as a result of the Allied threats in the
Ottoman Empire).
114 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 108; see generally
WILLIS, supra note 27, at 154 (discussing the unprecedented events that
unfolded in Constantinople); see also STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note
12, at 106 (“The Constantinople [Courts-Martial], had they not fallen apart,
would have been remembered as comparable only to Nuremberg and
Tokyo.”).
115 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 106; WILLIS, supra note
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post-war Turkish government—in addition to civil unrest across
the newly dissipated Ottoman Empire and other politicking, all
of which cast a long shadow over the legal process 116—the notion
that the Turkish government, even in defeat, would try its own
citizens for war crimes should not be overlooked. The local
Turkish government arrested more than one hundred
individuals, tried nine, and executed one for “acting against
humanity and civilization.”117 For its part, the British, the
driving force behind the trials, were initially compelled by a
“striking display” of “idealism and universalism” to punish those
responsible for the Armenian massacres.118 However, in time,
the British interest shifted to punishing crimes committed
against the British.119 This smacking of victors’ justice coupled
with civil and political discord rendered the Constantinople
Courts-Martial nearly meaningless.120
In addition to the Constantinople Courts-Martial, the
Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Allies and Turkey in 1920,121
offered a novel, even if similarly fleeting, advancement in
international humanitarian law. It included a unique provision
in Article 230, according to which Turkey would turn over any
27, at 148.
116 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 106, 118–20
(discussing Constantinople’s post-war trials and subsequent unrest); WILLIS,
supra note 27, at 154.
117 STAY THE HAND OF V ENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 125, 129 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (explaining that of those charged, three
defendants were acquitted and two more were sentenced but were never in
custody. One defendant was ultimately hanged for his role in the
deportations, while another defendant was sentenced to fifteen years’ hard
labor. The trials fell apart soon after they began, primarily because of the high
political tension in Turkey).
118 STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 106.
119 Id. at 107; see also WILLIS, supra note 27, at 154 (stating that, “[The
Brits’] greatest concern was to punish officials responsible for mistreating
British prisoners of war”).
120 See STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 106–07 (describing
that the political difficulties the British had in prosecuting foreign war
criminals not only caused the tribunal to crumble, but lead to a stunningly
embarrassing end); see also, WILLIS, supra note 27, at 148 (stating that Turkey
court-martialed some individuals in order to appease the Allies, but due to
legal and political reasons, never brought any of them to trial).
121 See Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, DIPUBLICO.ORG (Oct. 10, 2010),
https://www.dipublico.org/100760/the-treaty-of-sevres-1920-the-treatyof-peace-between-the-allied-and-associated-powers-and-turkey-signed-atsevres-august-10-1920/; see CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 89
n.11; From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 18, at 58.
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individuals responsible for the massacres to be tried by a
tribunal designated by the League of Nations or the Allies
themselves.122 The terms, however, were never adopted by the
Turkish government, and the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced in
1924 with the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained no mention
of the Armenians, the massacres, or crimes against humanity.123
Consequently, no Turkish war criminals were prosecuted before
an international tribunal or pursuant to the Allies’ treaty with
Turkey.
The importance of the immediate post-war efforts to
prosecute Turkish war criminals lies not so much in the overall
success of the Constantinople Courts-Martial or post-war
treaties—indeed, it would be hard to argue that there was any
such success124—rather, these mechanisms laid the groundwork
for a more successful effort to articulate and punish for crimes
committed against humanity several decades later.125
B. Crimes Against Humanity in the Commission Report
Following the war, global leaders met in Paris over the
course of a year to discuss and determine a new world order.126
122 Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, supra note 121, art. 230; see also CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 89 n.11 (providing a description of the
background, content, and outcome of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey at
Sèvres).
123 Treaty of Peace with Turkey at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 128 L.N.T.S.
11; Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, supra note 121, art. 230; see CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 89 n.11; Dadrian, supra note 76, at 281 (explaining
that paradoxically, as much as Article 230 could be seen as an advance in
international law by holding individuals accountable for mass atrocities,
Article 230 also arguably served as an example of victors’ justice and a
difficult demand for any nation to comply with).
124 See, e.g., STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, supra note 12, at 106
(“Constantinople is the Nuremberg that failed. What Constantinople shows,
most of all, is that the enormous political difficulties of mounting a
prosecution against foreign war criminals can be so great that a tribunal can
crumble.”); see also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 93 (recounting
that the parties to the Treaty of Sèvres “intended to bring to justice those who
committed ‘crimes against civilization and humanity,’” but noting that the
treaty was never ratified and in its place, the Treaty of Lausanne did not
include analogous language).
125 See, e.g., WILLIS, supra note 27, at 157 (observing that the post-WWI
efforts to hold the Turks criminally responsible for the Armenian massacres
“foreshadowed” the charges before the IMT, but noting that “in 1919 such a
new departure in international law proved impossible.”).
126 See MACMILLAN, supra note 40, at xxv.
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Although the 1919 Paris Peace Conference is often most closely
associated with the Treaty of Versailles, infamously signed
between the Allies and Germany, the parties addressed
numerous other issues at the peace conference, including the
establishment of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the
Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties
(“Commission”).127 The Commission was constructed to inquire
into the various legal issues at the fore of the peace conference,
primarily the “responsibility [and identity] of the authors of the
war,” the “facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war,”
and the “degree of responsibility for these offences.”128 The first
of three Commission subcommittees took on the task of
identifying and characterizing criminal conduct.129
This
investigation focused on traditional war crimes as well as crimes
committed by governments against their own people. 130 On
March 29, 1919, the Commission issued the Commission Report,
which provided recommendations on war guilt, war crimes—
including violations of the “elementary laws of humanity”—and
the jurisdiction of an associated tribunal.131 The Commission
Report is important because, echoing the terms of the 1915
Declaration, it invoked language contained in the Preamble to
the 1907 Hague Convention (“Martens Clause”) as a basis for
criminal responsibility for the violation of the laws of humanity,
and it provided a list of crimes committed by the Central Powers
(“Versailles List”) that helped to define the charge of “crimes
against humanity.”
1. The Martens Clause
Under international law, precedent to adequately punish
the Turks for the massacre of the Armenians was limited.132
127 Id. at xxv–xxvi; see WILLIS, supra note 27, at 68–71 (discussing the
details of the Commission, its makeup, and purpose).
128 Commission Report, supra note 28, at 95.
129 WILLIS, supra note 27, at 71–72.
130 See WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 253–54; WILLIS,
supra note 26, at 71–72.
131 Commission Report, supra note 28, at 95, 115; WWI & the Handicapped
System, supra note 27, at 254.
132 See, e.g., CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 89 (describing the
U.S. objection to the Commission Report regarding crimes against humanity
as being based on the fact that such crimes were not part of then-operative
international law); TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 13 (“The Armenians were citizens
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Importantly, the 1907 Hague Convention only proscribed
prohibitions on the conduct of one belligerent nation against
another; it did not expressly contemplate the treatment by a
country of its own people. 133 The authors of the Commission
Report, however, found that the 1907 Hague Convention’s
Preamble might provide the basis necessary to criminalize the
Young Turks’ slaughter of fellow Turkish citizens. 134 The
relevant portion of the Preamble, known as the Martens Clause,
states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, […]
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.135

The authors of the Commission Report viewed the Martens
Clause as a catch-all that enlarged the scope of the treaty’s
terms: where there was no express provision of codified
international law applicable, the laws of humanity were to
govern and fill in these gaps.136 Along these lines, and mirroring
the language of the Martens Clause, the Greek foreign minister
suggested that a new category of war crime be established, since,
“[t]echnically [the Armenian massacres] did not come within the
of the Ottoman Empire; there was no formal state of war between Armenians
and Turks, and so the Hague Conventions were wholly inapplicable. In May
1915 a joint Allied declaration denounced the Turkish actions as “crimes
against humanity and civilization,” but that was a concept quite outside the
scope of any treaties or recognized doctrine.”).
133 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 46; TAYLOR, supra note 8, at
13; WILLIS, supra note 27, at 157.
134 See WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 263–64; From
Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 18, at 16–17; Dadrian, supra note 76, at 280;
see also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 87–91 (describing the
chronology from the 1907 Hague Convention and Martens Clause to the
Commission Report).
135 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.; see From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 18, at 16. The Preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention
similarly contains reference, albeit broad, to principles of “the laws of
humanity.” 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. (“[P]opulations and
belligerents remain under the protections and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience.”).
136 See WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 263–64; From
Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 18, at 16–17; Dadrian, supra note 76, at 279–
80.
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provisions of the penal code, but they constituted grave offenses
against the law of humanity.”137 Thus, a reliance on the Martens
Clause language was “designed to enable the Allies to prosecute”
the Turkish perpetrators, which was otherwise difficult to do,
consistent with the concept of legality and under the substantive
provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention.138 The American
representatives to the Commission, Robert Lansing and James
Brown Scott, objected to the invocation of the Martens Clause
and reliance on “laws of humanity” since these concepts offered
arbitrary and undefined standards that varied “with the
individual consciences” of the different countries.139
The
Dadrian, supra note 76, at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 263–64
(positing also that the Commission Report’s wording, inspired by the 1907
Hague Convention, was intended to allow for punishment of the Armenian
massacre “perpetrated under the guise of wartime deportations”); see also
Schwelb, supra note 5, at 124 (noting that the consistency of the language
used in the 1915 Declaration and Article 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres was
intended to “bring justice” to Turks who had massacred the Armenians).
139 WILLIS, supra note 27, at 75; see Commission Report, supra note 28, at
33 (“[I]f political power is so evenly adjusted that no reliable estimate can be
formed of the probable consequences of an upheaval, the intending lawbreaker may… have sufficient self-confidence to tempt the issue”); see BASS,
supra note 12, at 110 (discussing how “Lansing led the American delegation’s
split from the Allied plans for war crimes tribunals [at the Paris Peace
Conference]”); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS 9 (Robert Cryer ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2019) (explaining more precisely, how the Americans
concurred with the Commission Report’s findings as to the “laws and
customs of war,” which were “standard certain, to be found in books of
authority and in the practice of nations,” but rejected the invocation of
offenses against the “laws of humanity”); Commission Report, supra note 28,
at 133–34 (explaining in its reservation to the Commission Report, the
United States took the position that, “[T]he report of the Commission does
not, as in the opinion of the American representatives it should, confine itself
to the ascertainment of the facts and to their violation of the laws and
customs of war, but, going beyond the terms of the mandate, declares that
the facts found and acts committed were in violation of the laws and of the
elementary principles of humanity. The laws and customs of war are a
standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of
nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which,
if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of
justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law. The
American representatives, therefore, objected to the references to the laws
and principles of humanity, to be found in the report, in what they believed
was meant to be a judicial proceeding, as, in their opinion, the facts found
were to be violations or breaches of the laws and customs of war, and the
persons singled out for trial and punishment for acts committed during the
war were only to be those persons guilty of acts which should have been
committed in violation of the laws and customs of war.”).
137
138
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Americans’ concern for strict legality and the lack of applicable
precedent led them to submit formal reservations to the
Commission Report’s findings and to disagree with the
European Allies on several other issues, like trying the Kaiser
and creating an international tribunal.140 Lansing and Scott’s
shared concern for a lack of precedent in 1919141 reflects a
concern for legality and reluctance to engage in punishment
suggestive of victors’ justice. In this sense, it could be said that
such opposition to the 1919 Commission Report served as a
vetting process for the 1945 Charter several decades later:
though “such a new departure from international law proved
impossible” in 1919, the world would become better acquainted
with the concept of crimes against humanity by 1945.142
Ultimately, the Commission adopted the Martens Clause
language in its report, identifying and recommending
punishment for various “violations of the laws of humanity.”143
This conclusion created a link from the 1907 Hague Convention
to the 1915 Declaration and 1919 Committee Report. Although
these recommendations regarding the laws of humanity were
not taken up in the Treaty of Versailles or the Treaty of
Lausanne, the linguistic continuity and findings of the
Commission Report nevertheless provide more legitimacy for
crimes against humanity.144
Several decades later, when the Allies met in post-WWII
London, they were faced with similar but larger scale matters of
genocide and mass atrocities.145 The impact of the WWI era
140 See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 123–24 (explaining that the dissenting
report of American members Robert Lansing and James Scott objected “to
the use of the term ‘laws of humanity,’ and … mainly directed [their
opposition] against the majority report [because] the words ‘and the laws of
humanity’ had been improperly added.”); TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 15–16
(discussing the American opposition against a “High Tribunal” and the “trial
of the Kaiser” and the resulting lack of an “international war crimes court”
and “trial to determine Kaiser’s criminal guilt.”); WILLIS, supra note 27, at 69
(explaining Lansings’ emphasis on a “lack of precedent” in order to reject
“virtually every important proposal offered by the Europeans.”).
141 See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 69, 157.
142 Id. at 157.
143 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 28, at 112–15, 121–24, 144
(discussing list of charges and outlined plans for trial against Germany
because of its outrageous conduct during the war).
144 See Theodor Meron, The Marten Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates
of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L., 78, 87 (2000).

145

See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 457.
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jurisprudence was subtle, but nevertheless guided the
delegation’s creation and definition of crimes against humanity
in Article 6 of the Charter.146 Article 6(c), the first binding
codification of crimes against humanity, read:
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.147

A look at the deliberations leading up to the final draft of
Article 6 shows the various ways that the WWI era work
regarding crimes against humanity grounded and guided the
Allied delegation. Notably, the drafted proposals from each of
the four major Allied nations included language borrowed from
the Martens Clause: “laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.”148 Depending on the various drafts, the “laws
of humanity” served different purposes, either to define the
scope of the IMT’s jurisdiction or to define the law to be applied
by the IMT.149 For example, the French draft proposed to give
the IMT jurisdiction over “atrocities and persecutions against
civilian populations [and over those who were] responsible for
the violations of international law, the laws of humanity, [and]
dictates of the public conscience.”150 A later British draft did not
list crimes against humanity as a stand-alone crime over which
the IMT would have jurisdiction, but it did note that the
Tribunal would have jurisdiction over anyone “who is hereby
declared therefore to be personally answerable for the violations
of international law, of the laws of humanity, and of the dictates
See id. at 466.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
148 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.; U.S. Dep’t of State
Pub. 3080, Division of Publications Office of Public Affairs, Intl. Org. and
Conference Series 58, 87, 293, 373 (1949) [hereinafter Conference Series].
149 See id. at 58 (defining international law as that which “include[s]
treaties between nations and the principles of the law of nations as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”).
150 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, at 293.
146
147
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of the public conscience.”151 These drafts and the final language
of Article 6 have clear ties to the text of the Martens Clause,
Declaration, and Commission Report.152 Consequently, this
historical and linguistic link gives greater weight and validity to
the IMT’s convictions for crimes against humanity.
Besides the drafting process and operative language of
Article 6, additional sentiments during the London Conference
and IMT shaped the continued evolution of crimes against
humanity. In a 1944 statement from President Roosevelt, the
President drew on the language of the Declaration and lamented
that “Hitler is committing these crimes against humanity in the
name of the German people.” 153 Additionally, in a report to
President Truman prior to the end of the war, Justice Jackson
reflected on the need to side with humanity and to address these
“deepest against that International Law [...] as including the
laws of humanity.”154 Similarly, in his closing remarks before
the IMT, Chief British Prosecutor Sir Hartely Shawcross
reminded the Tribunal that, “[t]he same view was acted upon by
the European Powers which in time past intervened in order to
protect the Christian subjects of Turkey against cruel
persecution. The fact is that the right of humanitarian
intervention by war is not a novelty in International Law.”155
The historical and linguistic connections that extend from the
1907 Hague Convention to the Declaration, the Commission
Report, and ultimately Article 6, are important in showing the
growing recognition of crimes against humanity. This evolution
depicts an international community that became increasingly
aware of the violent totality of modern warfare and that
endeavored, over decades, to broaden the traditional protections
of civilians during wartime.

151 Id. at 312, 327 (showing that the Soviets also produced a draft that
reflected the same general terms as those proposed by the British).
152 See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 4, at 95; Roger S. Clark,
Crimes Against Humanity, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
183–84 n.23 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
153 Conference Series, supra note 148, at 58.
154 Id. at 49, 439 (internal quotations omitted).
155 Schwelb, supra note 5, at 198 (quoting SPEECHES OF THE CHIEF
PROSECUTORS AT THE CLOSE OF THE CASE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS).
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2. The Versailles List
Relying on a variety of documents, reports, and accounts
from across Europe, the Commission subcommittee identified
thirty-two crimes committed by the Central Powers, which were
published as part of the Commission Report and collectively
referred to as the Versailles List. 156 The first crime enumerated
was “[m]urders and [m]assacres: [s]ystematic [t]errorism,”
which was specifically described in the report’s annex as the
“[m]assacres of Armenians by the Turks.” 157 Moreover, the
Commission concluded that certain of the enumerated crimes
amounted to the violation of the “elementary laws of
humanity.”158 The inclusion of this language is important
because, more so than the 1915 Declaration, the Commission
Report reflects a formal assessment of responsibility, which was
reached after a fact-finding and investigatory process.159 The
language of the Commission Report is also important because it
contains the thoughts and conclusions of ten nations, rather
than only the three European Allies that issued the
Declaration.160
Additionally, the Versailles List guided the later-formed
United Nations War Crimes Commission (“UNWCC”) in its
recommendations regarding the prosecution of Axis WWII war
crimes.161 The UNWCC, which was established in 1943 to
provide support to national governments in prosecuting and
convicting war criminals, looked to the Versailles List as the
basis for the legal precedent utilized by the UNWCC as it
pursued investigations and prosecutions.162
From the
Commission Report, supra note 28, at 114–15.
Id.; WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 262.
158 Commission Report, supra note 28, at 115.
159 See id. at 114–15 (listing the factual sources that the Commission
drew from in its evaluation of wartime criminality).
160 See id. at 96–97, 125–26 (listing the fifteen Commission members
from the ten Allied nations while also noting that of these ten nations,
America and Japan submitted reservations to the Commission Report). The
Americans’ reservation to the Commission Report underscores the essential,
building block nature of the WWI era development in international law,
making the “new departure from international law” in 1919 a more familiar
concept by 1945. See WILLIS, supra note 27, at 157.
161 See Dan Plesch & Shanti Sattler, Changing the Paradigm of
International Criminal Law: Considering the Work of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission of 1943-1948, 15 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 203, 220, 222 (2013).
162 Id. at 220; Dan Piesch & Shanti Sattler, Before Nuremberg: Considering
156
157

33

134

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 34:2

perspective of the UNWCC, the Versailles List was also valuable
as a legal tool because Axis Powers Italy and Japan had
“endorsed” the enumeration of crimes after WWI and Germany
had not opposed it.163
V. CONCLUSION
The 1919 Paris Peace Conference is often considered to have
been a failure of international law: the representatives were
unable to conclude fair and lasting treaties, successfully
prosecute perpetrators for the commission of war crimes, and
effect consequences for waging an aggressive war. 164 However,
these post-war efforts helped lay foundations for the future
development of international law, particularly with respect to
crimes against humanity. Importantly, the Allies’ response to
the Armenian genocide—the Declaration that was issued in
defense of citizens of a non-Allied country and on the heels of a
major Allied defeat—articulated “crimes against humanity” for
the first time in history.165 The Declaration, together with the
Commission Report and the Martens Clause, provided the
representatives at the 1945 London Conference with a basis on
which to formulate and prosecute a new kind of war crime.166
They brought precedential value to the Charter’s new charge of
crimes against humanity and simultaneously helped to rebut
claims that the IMT and its law was nothing more than victors’
justice.

the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943-1948 in 20
FICHL PUBL’N SERIES, HIST. ORIGINS OF INT’L CRIMINAL LAW: VOL. 1 437, 443
(Morten Bergsmo et al. eds., 2014).
163 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Notes of a Second Unofficial
Meeting Held on 2nd December, 1943, at 3:00 p.m. at the Royal Courts of Justice,
London, ICC LEGAL TOOLS DATABASE (Dec. 2, 1943), https://www.legaltools.org/doc/3e7e05/.
164 Robert Gerwarth, Paris Peace Treaties failed to create a secure,
peaceful and lasting world order, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/paris-peace-treaties-failedto-create-a-secure-peaceful-and-lasting-world-order-1.3745849.
165 Rouben Paul Adalian, International Recognition of the Armenian
Genocide,
ARMENIAN
NAT’L
INST.,
https://www.armeniangenocide.org/recognition.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
166 See WWI & the Handicapped System, supra note 27, at 254, 260 (explaining
how the delegates of the London Conference referenced the post-war efforts to reach
their conclusion).
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